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Introduction 
Although economists and environmentalists often find them-
selves on opposite sides of specific issues, they occupy some com-
mon ground. A healthful environment is essential for the effective 
conduct of economic and other human activities. Even the most 
theoretical economist breathes the same air and drinks the same 
water as members of the Sierra Club; in fact, he or she may be a 
dues-paying member. 
Likewise, a strong economy provides the resources for human 
activity, including dealing with ecological problems. It also gener-
ates the rising living standard that enables citizens to focus on 
serious concerns beyond the immediate one of paying for everyday 
necessities. Balancing economic and ecological concerns is hardly 
an either/or matter. 
Any doubt on that score can be resolved by examining the plight 
of many East European nations. Their weak economies have been 
unable to support the environmental cleanup taking place in West-
ern societies. The result has been "an ecological disaster zone," 
where even the snow is black. Fines levied on polluters are ineffec-
tive in their socialized economies because the government, as owner 
of all property, ends up paying the penalties.1 
The situation is very different in the United States. Rather than 
subordinating environmental concerns to economic goals, we tend to 
ignore economic considerations in fashioning public policy on eco-
logical issues. 
Public Support and Individual Reluctance 
Every poll of citizen sentiment shows overwhelming support for 
doing more to clean up the environment. A public opinion survey 
by The New York Times and CBS News reported in 1983 that 58 per-
cent of the sample agreed with the following strong statement: 
"Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and 
standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental 
improvements must be made regardless of cost."2 
Nevertheless, despite the continuation of such an overwhelming 
public mandate and a plethora of new laws and directives by the 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plus hundreds of billions 
of dollars of compliance costs expended by private industry, the 
public remains unhappy with the results. 
Unfortunately, environmental action is an extremely important 
example of not wishing to pay the piper. Those same citizens who 
want environmental improvements "regardless of cost" vociferously 
and adamantly oppose the location of any hazardous waste facility 
in their own neighborhood. Nor are they keen on paying for the 
cleanup. Of course, they strongly favor cleaning up the environ-
ment, but each prefers to have the dump site located in someone 
else's backyard and to have the other fellow pay for it. 
An example of this situation is the reaction of the enlightened 
citizens of Minnesota to a $3.7 million grant from the EPA to build 
and operate a state-of-the-art chemical landfill that could handle 
hazardous wastes with a high assurance of safety. In each of the six-
teen locations that the state proposed, the local residents raised 
such a fuss and howl that the state government backed off. Ulti-
mately, the unspent grant was returned to EPA. 
The Minnesota experience is not exceptional. The EPA was also 
forced to stop a project to test whether the sludge from a municipal 
waste treatment plant could be used as a low-cost fertilizer. The 
public opposition was fierce, even though the EPA was going to use 
federally owned land and the sludge was expected to increase crop 
yields by 30 percent.3 
Since 1980, not a single major new disposal facility has been sited 
anywhere in the United States. According to a state-by-state review, 
the outlook for the future is "even more bleak," in large part because 
of a worsening of the emotional atmosphere surrounding any effort 
to locate a new dump site.'' As Professor Peter Sandman of Rutgers 
University has pointed out, the public perceives environmental mat-
ters not only emotionally, but also morally. "Our society," he has 
written, "has reached near-consensus that pollution is morally wrong 
-- not just harmful or dangerous . . . but wrong. "5 Yet, the 
individuals that make up that same public are reluctant personally to 
assume the burdens associated with that strongly held view. 
This ambivalent attitude toward the environment is not new. In 
1969, the National Wildlife Federation commissioned a national 
survey to ascertain how much people were willing to pay for a 
cleaner environment. At a time of peak enthusiasm for environ-
mental regulation, the public was asked, "To stop the pollution 
destroying our plant life and wildlife, would you be willing to pay an 
increase in your monthly electric bill of $1 ?" The "no" vote won 
hands down, 62 percent to 28 percent (with 10 percent "not sure").6 
That study, we should recall, was taken before the big runup in util-
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ity bills. Perhaps not too surprisingly, the survey showed strong 
support for taxing business to finance environmental cleanup. 
In other words, most of us Americans very much want a cleaner 
environment, but are neither willing to pay for it nor seriously to 
inconvenience ourselves. We try to take the easy way out -- by 
imposing the burden on "someone else," preferably a large imper-
sonal institution. 
Trying to Do Everything at Once 
It is much easier for Congress to express a desire for cleaner air 
or purer water than for an agency like the EPA to fulfill that desire. 
To be sure, vast sums of money have been spent for these purposes 
in recent years. From 1970 to 1986, Congress appropriated over $55 
billion for the operation of the EPA. The headcount of EPA 
employment rose from a few hundred in 1970 to over nine thousand 
in 1988. These numbers are dwarfed by the costs incurred in the 
private sector to comply with the government's rules on environ-
mental cleanup. The U.S. Council on Environmental Quality esti-
mated the total at over $100 billion for 1988 and over $750 billion 
for the preceding decade (in dollars of 1986 purchasing power).7 
These staggering outlays have not prevented the critics from 
instituting an almost endless array of lawsuits whose main purpose 
is to get the EPA to act faster and to do more. Typical of the 
assaults on the EPA is this statement by Congressman James J. 
Florio of New Jersey: "They are not in charge. They do not have 
the resources by their own actions to get the work done, and they 
are more interested in cosmetics than anything."8 
The plaintive response of the EPA administrator at the time was 
that "EPA's plate is very full right now."9 That plate is being heaped 
higher on an almost daily basis. One of EPA's newest responsibili-
ties, for instance, is regulation of genetically engineered pesticides. 
Moreover, rapid scientific improvements permit the detection and, 
perhaps, regulation of ever more minute quantities of pollutants. 
Meanwhile, John Q. Public (and Jane Q. Public) are making the 
problem worse. In 1965, the average American disposed of three 
pounds of garbage a day. By 1985, that figure was up to four pounds 
each day and rising -- in addition to wastes from agriculture, mining, 
industry, construction and demolition, sewage, and junked autos.10 
To be sure, the EPA can claim important accomplishments. 
Between 1970 and 1985, air pollution from vehicles was reduced by 
46 percent for hydrocarbons, 34 percent for carbon monoxide, and 
75 percent for lead. Rivers from coast to coast that were nearly 
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devoid of life teem with fish once again. Lake Erie, so laden with 
pollutants in 1969 that a river feeding into it caught fire, has been 
revived.11 
Despite these successes, the EPA frequently falls short in meet-
ing congressionally mandated goals for pollution cleanup. The hard 
fact is that the status quo in environmental policy is not sufficient. 
Congress continues to pass high-sounding legislation with unrealistic 
timetables and inflexible deadlines, while the EPA gets ever greater 
responsibility and private industry spends billions more on environ-
mental compliance. In the words of the EPA's former administrator 
William Ruckelshaus, "EPA's statutory framework is less a coherent 
attack on a complex and integrated societal problem than it is a 
series of petrified postures. "12 
Exceptions to the Rules 
The Public Sector Drags Its Feet 
In addition, misperceptions of the villains in the pollution story 
abound. Many people fall into a common trap -- that of associating 
polluters exclusively with business. Many companies do generate 
lots of pollution. But the same can be said about government agen-
cies, hospitals, schools, and colleges. 
Moreover, the EPA lacks the enforcement power over the public 
sector that it possesses over the private sector. Reports of plant 
closings because of the high cost of meeting environmental stan-
dards are common. In contrast, there is no record of a single gov-
ernment facility closing down because it was not meeting ecological 
requirements. 
It is not surprising, for instance, that the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) says that the performance of federal agencies in car-
rying out the requirements of hazardous-waste disposal "has not 
been exemplary." A GAO report issued in 1986 says that, of 72 fed-
eral facilities inspected, 33 were in violation of EPA requirements 
and 22 had been cited for Class 1 (serious) violations. Sixteen of the 
33 facilities remained out of compliance for six months or more. 
Three had been out of compliance for more than three years.13 A 
follow-up report by the GAO in 1987 showed little further progress. 
Only four of eleven federal agencies had completed the identifica-
tion of hazardous-waste sites and none had finished assessing the 
environmental problems they had uncovered. Of 511 federal sites 
failing to meet EPA standards, only 78 had been cleaned up.14 
A major offender is the Department of Defense, which now gen-
erates over 500,000 tons of hazardous waste a year. That is more 
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"cal . b" d 15 than is produced by the five largest chenu ~mparu~s com me · 
The lax situation uncovered by the GAO at Tinker Air Force Ba~e, 
in Oklahoma, is typical of the way in which many federal agencies 
respond to the EPA's directives: .. "Althou~ DOD [Dep~rtment of 
Defense] policy calls for the military services to . . . Implement 
EPA's hazardous waste management regulations, we found that 
Tinker has been selling ... waste oil, fuels, and solvents rather than 
lin nl6 ... recyc g .... 
Congress wants a cleaner environment. but so far has not m~tered 
the will to impose even modest pollution controls on a polztically 
powerful group of constituents --fanners. 
The GAO reported that two of the five commercial waste sites 
receiving the base's wastes had major complia!lce problems. Also, 
personnel at Tinker Air Force Base were dumpmg hazardous wastes 
in landfills that themselves were in violation of EPA requirements. 
In one case the EPA had been urging the Oklahoma Department of 
Health for ~everal years not to renew a landfill's permit. In another 
instance the State Water Resources Board was seeking a court 
order td close the site. Civilian agencies, including those in state 
and local governments continue to be reluctant to follow the same 
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environmental standards that they Impose on the pnvate sector. 
Agricultural Interests Favored . 
Also, federal policy arbitrarily excludes on~ of .th~ l~rg~st smgle 
sources of pollution from the EPA's effective JUriSdiction: the 
runoff of pesticides and fertilizers f~om farms. ~8 The EPA reports 
that, in six of the agency's ten reg~ons, pollutio~ from farms and 
urban streets is the principal cause of water quality problems. But 
pollution from these sources remains virtually unregulated. . 
Large quantities of agricultural pollution can be controlled ~al!"ly 
easily at low cost by using limited-till plowing techniques. In striking 
contrast, industrial pollution control has often been pushed to the 
limits of economic feasibility. Nevertheless, Congress follows a 
double standard: for urban and industrial pollution it requires the 
imposition of tough and detailed standards t? qualify for p~rmits to 
discharge wastes. For rural and farm pollution, the EPA IS merely 
given money to study the problem. 
Like the rest of us, Congress wants a cleaner environment. But 
so far it has not mustered the will required to impose the most 
modest pollution controls on a politically powerful group of con-
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stituents. To be sure, farm families also want a cleaner environment 
-- but it is always nice to get someone else to pay for your desires. 
Economic Solutions to Hazardous Waste Problems 
Turning to specific environmental problems, we can start with 
the controversy over the disposal of hazardous wastes. Instances of 
toxic-waste contamination at Love Canal, in New York State and at 
Times Beach, Missour~ have brought a sense of urgency' to the 
problem. The public mood on the subject of hazardous waste leaves 
little room for patience -- but much opportunity for emotional 
response. 
Emotionally charged responses are encouraged by the fact that 
even scientists know little about the effects on human health of 
many toxic substances, such as the various forms of dioxin. Levels 
of some substances can now be measured by the EPA in terms of 
parts per billion and occasionally per quadrillion, but even the 
experts still debate the significance of exposure at those rates. In 
effect, the scare headlines about chemical health hazards deal with 
exposures that are akin to the proverbial needle in the haystack. 
Actually, the needle-haystack comparison is much too modest. One 
part per ~~on is the equivalent of one inch in 16,000 miles, a penny 
m $10 ~illi?n, four drops of water in an Olympic-size pool, or a 
second m thrrty-two years. 
The most severe reaction to dioxin reported so far by humans is 
a bad case of chloracne, a severe acne-like rash. The bulk of the 
available information on dioxin and other hazards is based on 
extrapolating fro~ data on animal experiments, which is very tricky. 
~ost tests on anrmals are conducted at extremely high concentra-
tions of the suspected element, which do not reflect real-world 
conditions in which the animals (or humans) live. Scientists note 
that the massive doses that are fed the animals overwhelm their 
entire bodies. Moreover, a level of exposure that is harmful to one 
type of animal may not be injurious to another. For example the 
lethal dose of the most toxic dioxin (2, 3, 7, 8 TCDD) for hamst~rs is 
5,000 times higher than that for guinea pigs.19 Extrapolating the 
results to humans is even more conjectural. 
However, our hearts must go out to the people in Times Beach 
Missouri, and in Love Canal, New York, who have suffered sever~ 
financial and psychological damage from the emotional responses to 
the scare. stories they have seen and heard so frequently. 
In trymg to avoid a repetition of these situations the EPA has 
promulgated detailed regulations on how polluters m'ust keep track 
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of hazardous wastes and how they should dispose of them. Because 
of growing public concern over leaky and dangerous dump sites, 
Congress. in late 1986 extended and expanded Superfund, the pro-
gram des1gned to clean up hazardous waste sites. The law requires 
companies an~ ultimately, consumers to pay $9 billion into Super-
fund by 1991.2 Yet, despite all this effort and attention, the prob-
lem of how to dump hazardous wastes is scarcely less serious than it 
was in 1980, before Congress passed the original Superfund law. 
As it stands, the law provides for a large fund raised primarily 
through taxes on producers of chemical and petroleum products. 
The EPA uses this money to identify and clean up hazardous waste 
~ites. But little progress is made because, as we noted earlier, there 
1S a severe shortage of dump sites. 
A more clearheaded view of waste disposal problems is needed 
in the United States. Because definitions vary among levels of gov-
ernment, estimates of the amount of hazardous waste disposed of 
each year in the United States range from 30 million to 264 million 
metric tons. Most of this waste is buried in landfills because incin-
eration, the safest and most effective means of disposal, is nearly ten 
times as costly. Even so, government and industry spend over $5 
billion each year to manage toxic wastes. The annual cost by 1990 is 
projected to reach $12 billion. 21 
Many experts believe that using landfills is inherently unsafe, if 
for no other reason than that they are only storage sites. Moreover, 
there are not enough of them. The EPA estimates that 22,000 waste 
sites now exist in the United States, and fully 10 percent of them are 
believed to be dangerous and leaking. 
The result: not enough reliable, environmentally safe places to 
dump toxic substances. Although EPA wants to clean up as many 
landfills as possible, it has very little choice as to where to put the 
material it removes under the Superfund mandate. Taxpayers may 
~ind up paying for the costly removal of waste from one site, only to 
fmd later on that they have to pay again for removing it from yet 
another dangerous site. 
Meanwhile, legal fees mushroom. The litigation costs involving 
cleanup at the various Superfund sites are estimated to run some-
where between $3.5 billion and $6.4 billion. 22 
Economic Incentives Are Needed 
Eventually, society will have to face the main reason for the 
scarcity of hazardous-waste sites -- the "not in my backyard" syn-
drome. Sites for the disposal of toxic substances have joined prisons 
and mental hospitals as things the public wants, but not too close by. 
The hazardous-waste-disposal problem is not going to disappear 
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unless Americans change to less polluting methods of production 
and consumption. Until then, greater understanding is needed on 
the part of the public and a willingness to come to grips with the dif-
ficult problems arising from the production and use of hazardous 
substances. Of course, it will cost large amounts of money (probably 
in the hundreds of billions of private and public expenditures in the 
next decade) to meet society's environmental expectations. But 
spending money may be the easiest part of the problem. Getting 
people to accept dump sites in their neighborhoods is much more 
difficult. 
The answer surely is an appeal not merely to good citizenship but 
also to common sense and self-interest. In a totalitarian society, 
people who do not want to do something the government desires are 
simply forced to do so, with the threat of physical violence ever pre-
sent. In a free society with a market economy, we offer to pay 
people to do something they otherwise would not do. The clearest 
example in modern times is the successful elimination of the 
military draft coupled with very substantial increases in pay and 
fringe benefits for voluntarily serving in the armed forces. 
Individual citizens have much to gain by opposing hazardous 
waste facilities to be located near them-- and there is a basic logic 
to their position. It is not fair for society as a whole to benefit from 
a new disposal site, while imposing most of the costs (ranging from 
danger of leakage to depressed property values) on the people in 
the locality. But local resistance to dealing with hazardous wastes 
does impose large costs on society as a whole. Those costs are in 
the form both of inhibiting economic progress and having to ship 
waste from one temporary site to another. 
There is a way of reconciling individual interests and community 
concerns. It is by the use of economic incentives. The idea is to 
look upon environmental pollution not as a sinful act but as an 
activity costly to society and susceptible to reduction by means of 
proper incentives. Mter all, the prospect of jobs and income 
encourages many communities to offer tax holidays and other 
enticements to companies considering the location of a new factory 
-- even though it may not exactly improve the physical environment 
of the region. Under present arrangements, however, there is no 
incentive for the citizens of an area to accept a site for hazardous 
wastes in their vicinity, no matter how safe it is. 
But perhaps some areas would accept such a facility if the state 
government ( fmanced by all the citizens benefiting from the disposal 
facility) would pay for something the people in that locality want but 
cannot afford -- such as a new school building, firehouse, or library 
or simply lower property taxes.23 Unlike an industrial factory, a 
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hazardous-waste facility provides few offsettin} benefits to the local 
residents in the form of jobs or tax revenues.2 (See box on page 10 
for examples of the use of incentives.) 
There is much that government can do to improve environmental 
policy in other ways. The EPA could reduce the entire hazardous-
waste problem by distinguishing between truly lethal wastes -- which 
clearly should be disposed of with great care -- and wastes that 
contain only trace or minute amounts of undesirable materials. To 
the extent that changes in legislation would be required, the agency 
should urge Congress to make them. 
The experience of a company in Oregon provides insights into 
why Congress needs to legislate common sense into the antipollu-
tion laws. The firm has been dumping heavy-metal sludges on its 
property for over twenty years. Company officials told the General 
Accounting Office that they automatically classify the material as 
hazardous. Why? Because it would be too costly and time-
consuming to try to prove that it was not. The GAO learned from 
several industry associations that other companies, similarly uncer-
tain and wanting to avoid expensive testing costs, simply declare 
their wastes to be hazardous, whether they really are dangerous or 
not. 26 That is not the only example in which those complying with 
environmental regulations lose sight of the fundamental objectives 
to be met. 
Tackling First Things First 
A 1987 EPA report concluded that the agency's priorities "do not 
correspond well" with its rankings by risk of the various ecological 
problems that it is dealing with. Thus, the agency's own study found 
areas of high risk but little regulatory effort. A key example is 
runoff of polluted water from farms and city streets. 
Conversely, the study showed that areas of "high EPA effort but 
relatively low risks" included management of hazardous wastes, 
cleanup of chemical waste dumps, regulation of underground stor-
age tanks containing petroleum or other hazardous substances, and 
municipal solid waste. 26 The reason for this mismatch between 
needs and resources is obvious. The EPA's priorities are set by 
Congress and reflect public pressure more than scientific knowl-
edge. Driven by the forces of environmental politics, the nation has 
repeatedly committed itself to goals and programs that are unrealis-
tic. This has meant deploying regulatory manpower unwisely and 
diverting limited resources to concerns of marginal importance. 
The results of this mismatch are substantial. Not all hazards are 
created equal. Some disposal sites are being filled with innocuous 
9 
Citizens Understand Incentives Even H 
Politicians Do Not 
An episode in 1985 shows the promise of the incentive approach. In the 
town of Lisbon, Connecticut, an entrepreneur proposed to locate a modem 
incinerator that would generate both energy from waste and $1 million in tax 
revenues. Despite the financial incentive and assurance that the incinerator 
would be equipped with the latest antipollution devices, he was rebuffed. 
Then the businessman tried another tactic. Instead of saying that the new 
facility would bring the town $1 million a year income in additional taxes, he 
promised to pay the property taxes of every landowner in the town for the 
next twenty-five years. Actually, the total cost would be about the same. But 
individual citizens could appreciate the direct benefits of the second 
approach. 
Local opposition to the undertaking quickly diminished. A town 
referendum on the incinerator yielded a vote of 680 in favor and 540 
opposed. But that vote was only advisory. Later on, the town planning and 
zoning commission voted 5 to 4 against the project. The incentive approach, 
in the case of Lisbon, can be described as producing a near miss. Yet the 
incident does show the latent support for making difficult trade-offs when 
citizens are provided with some reasonable -- and, in this case, imaginative --
alternatives. 
A more direct example of using economic incentives to locate inherently 
undesirable storage facilities occurred in 1987. A proposed dump site for 
medical supplies contaminated by low-level radiation was estimated to 
provide about forty new jobs. Three poor communities in the Mojave Desert 
region in southern California vied spiritedly fyr the project, overcoming their 
concerns over possible environmental impact. 
Also in 1987, Senators J. Bennett Johnston, Jr. (Democrat of Louisiana), 
and James McClure (Republican of Idaho) proposed that a state agreeing to 
the location of a nuclear disposal site within its borders would receive large 
incentive payments from the Department of Energy. Over the thirty- to 
forty-year life of the repository project, these payments would run to several 
billion dollars. The governor of Nevada, a likely location, denounced the 
notion as "bribery" and "nuclear blackmail." Yet, in 1978, a state blue ribbon 
panel had recommended radioactive-waste disposal as a prime alternative 
use of the Nevada Test Site in the event of a ban on nuclear testing. It does 
seem that economic incentives can play a role in hazardous2waste disposal, but a good deal of time, patience, and effort may be required. 
1
"Desert Fight for Nuclear Dump," San Francisco Chronicle, March 14, 
1987, p. 5. See also Philip J. Bourque and R. Haney Scott, "Let States Bid for 
Nuclear Waste Repository," Pacific Northwest Executive, October 1986, p. 1. 
2Luther J. Carter, "U.S. Nuclear Waste Program At An Impasse," 
Resources, Summer 1987, pp. 2-4. 
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material while truly dangerous substances are or will be, for lack of 
space, dumped illegally or stored "temporarily." What would help is 
more widespread application of the legal concept known as de 
minimis non curant lex -- the law does not concern itself with trifles. 
Driven by the forces of environmental politics, the 
nation has repeatedly committed itself to goals and 
programs that are unrealistic. 
Back in 1979, a federal circuit court supported the view that 
there is a de minimis level of risk too small to affect human health 
adversely. It cited that doctrine in turning down the claim that some 
"migration" of substances occurred from the packaging into the food 
product. In 1985, the FDA concluded that using methylene chloride 
to extract caffeine from coffee presented a de minimis risk. Hence, 
the substance is safe for its intended use. In 1987, the National 
Research Council recommended that the EPA apply a "negligible 
risk" standard across the board in determinin~ how much of which 
pesticides can be permitted to show up in food. 7 
Cancerphobia Misallocates Resources 
One approach to eliminating the gridlock in regulatory policy is 
to focus on the underlying public concern that is driving the pres-
sures for more sweeping environmental and other social regulation. 
That concern is the worry about cancer. The regulatory waters have 
become badly muddied by the public's misconception of the causes 
of can~r. A widely. held notion is that the environment is primarily 
responsible. There Is, of course, a germ of truth to that belief. 
It turns out that several years ago a distinguished scientist-- John 
Higginson, director of the World Health Organization's Interna-
tional Agency for Research on Cancer -- assigned the primary blame 
for c:a~cer t.o ~hat he labele~ "environmental" causes. His highly-
publiciZed fmdmg that two-thrrds of all cancer was caused by envi-
ronmental factors provided ammunition for every ecological group 
t? push for tougher restrictions on all sorts of environmental pollu-
tion. 
However, upon a more careful reading, it is clear that the emi-
nent scientist was referring not to the physical environment but to 
!he age-old debate of "environment" versus "heredity" as the main 
mfluence on hu~an beings. In the case o~ cancer, he was identifying 
voluntary behavior -- such as personal life-styles and the kinds of 
food people eat -- as the main culprit responsible for cancer. Dr. 
Higginson specifically pointed out, "But when I used the term envi-
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ronment in those days, I was considering the total environment, cul-
tural as well as chemical ... air you breath, the culture you live in, 
the agricultural habits of your community, the social cultural habits, 
the social pressures, the physical chemicals with which you come in 
contact, the diet, and so on. "28 But that explanation has not slowed 
down the highly vocal ecology groups who latched on to a "catchy" 
albeit confused theme -- the extremely carcinogenic environment in 
which Americans supposedly live. 
More recently, one university scientist tried to add some objec-
tivity to the cancer debate by quantifying the issue. Professor Harry 
Demopoulos of the New York Medical Center examined why 
approximately 1,000 people die of cancer each day in the United 
States. About 450 of the deaths, or 45 percent, are attributable to 
diet. Citing the work of Dr. Arthur Upton of the National Cancer 
Institute, Demopoulos noted that eating more fresh fruits and ve~­
etables and curtailing fat consumption would be most helpful. 9 
Clearly, obesity is not the type of environmental pollution that justi-
fies the EPA's increasingly onerous standards. 
The second major cause of cancer deaths, according to 
Demopoulos, is the consumption of excessive quantities of distilled 
liquor and the smoking of high-tar cigarettes. These voluntary 
actions resulted in 350, or 35 percent, of the cancer deaths. Again, 
this is not the environmental pollution that motivates most ecology 
activists. 
A distant third in the tabulation of leading causes of cancer is 
occupational hazards, accounting for 5 percent of the total. 
Demopoulos believes that this category may have leveled off and be 
on the way down. He reasons that many of the occupationally 
induced cancers are due to exposures two or more decades ago, 
when scientists did not know that many chemicals were capable of 
causing cancer. 
A fourth category, accounting for 3 percent, is caused by expo-
sure to normal background radiation. The fifth and last category of 
causes of cancer (accounting for 2 percent) is preexisting medical 
disorders. These include chronic ulcerative colitis, chronic gastritis, 
and the like. The remaining 10 percent of the cancer deaths in the 
United States are due to all other causes; it is noteworthy that air 
and water pollution and all the other toxic hazards that are the pri-
mary cause of public worry are in this miscellaneous 10 percent, not 
in the 90 percent. Government policy is unbalanced when the great 
bulk of the effort deals with a category of risk that is only some frac-
tion of one-tenth of the problem. 
Hard data can dissipate much of the fear and fog generated by 
the many cancer-scare stories that the public has been subjected to 
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in recent years. Overall, cancer death rates are staying steady or 
coming down. The major exception is smoking-related cancer. For 
the decade 1974-83, stomach cancer was down 20 percent, cancer of 
the cervix-uterus was down 30 percent, and cancer of the ovary was 
down 8 percent. 
"We are the healthiest we have been in human history. " 
Dr. Bruce Ames 
University of California cancer expert 
Life expectancy is steadily increasing in the United States (to an 
all-time high of seventy-five, for those born in 1985)30 and in most 
other industrialized nations, except the Soviet Union. This has led 
the cancer expert Professor Bruce Ames of the University of Cali-
fornia to conclude, "We are the healthiest we have been in human 
history. "31 That is no justification for resting on laurels. Rather, 
Ames's point should merely help lower the decibel level of debates 
on environmental issues and enable analysis to dominate emotion in 
setting public policy in this vital area. 
A Birth Control Approach to Pollution 
Over 99 percent of environmental spending by government is 
devoted to controlling pollution after it is generated. Less than 1 
percent is spent to reduce the generation of pollutants.32 For fiscal 
1988, the EPA budgeted only $398,000 --or .03 percent of its funds 
-- for "waste minimization." That is an umbrella term that includes 
recycling and waste reduction. 33 
The most desirable approach is to reduce the generation of pol-
lutants in the first place. Economists have an approach that is 
useful-- providing incentives to manufacturers to change their pro-
duction processes to reduce the amount of wastes created or to 
recycle them in a safe and productive manner. 
The Hazardous Waste Example Revisited 
As we noted earlier, the government taxes producers rather than 
polluters. By doing that, the country misses a real opportunity to 
curb actual dumping of dangerous waste. The federal Superfund 
law is financed with taxes levied on producers of chemical 
"feedstocks" and petroleum plus a surtax on the profits of large 
manufacturing companies and contributions from the federal Trea-
sury. Thousands of companies outside of the oil and chemical 
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industries wind up paying very little, whether they are large polluters 
or not. Contrary to widely held views, a great deal of pollution 
occurs in sectors of the economy other than oil and chemicals. The 
manufacture of a sinfJe TV set generates about one hundred 
pounds of toxic wastes. ~ 
Switching to a waste-end fee levied on the amount of hazardous 
wastes that a company actually generates and disposes of would be 
far more economically sound than the status quo. This more 
enlightened approach would require a basic correction in the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (or "Superfund"), but it would be a very beneficial form of haz-
ardous waste "birth control." 
A General Application of Market Incentives 
More generally, if the government were to levy a fee on the 
amount of pollutants discharged, that would provide an incentive to 
reduce the actual generation of wastes. Some companies would find 
it cheaper to change their production processes than to pay the tax. 
Recycling and reuse systems would be encouraged. Moreover, such 
a tax or fee would cover imports which are now disposed of in our 
country tax free. In short, rewriting statutes, such as the Superfund 
law, so that they are more fair would also help protect the environ-
ment -- and would probably save money at the same time. 
Already, some companies are recycling as they become aware of 
the economic benefits.86 For example, one chemical firm bums 
165,000 tons of coal a year at one of its textile fibers factories, gen-
erating 35,000 tons of waste in the form of fly ash. The company 
recently found a local cement block company that was testing fly ash 
as a replacement for limestone in making lightweight cement blocks. 
The chemical company now sells the fly ash to the cement block 
manufacturer. What used to be an undesirable waste by-product 
has been turned into a commercially useful material. Simultane-
ously, the companies are conserving the supply of limestone. 
A timber company, through its research, developed a new use for 
tree bark, the last massive waste product of the wood products 
industry. The firm designed a bark processor that made it the first 
domestic producer of vegetable wax, an important ingredient in 
cosmetics and polishes. A factory in Illinois had been creating a 
veritable sea of calcium fluoride sludge (at the rate of 1,000 cubic 
yards a month) as a by-product of its manufacture of fluorine-based 
chemicals. The company found that the sludge could be mixed with 
another waste product to produce synthetic fluorspar, which it had 
been buying from other sources. Recycling the two waste products 
now saves the firm about $1 million a year. 
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Incentives to do more along these lines could be provided in sev-
eral ways. The producers could be subsidized to follow the desired 
approach. In this period of large budget deficits, that would, of 
course, increase the amount of money that the Treasury must bor-
row. 
The pollution tax approach appeals to self-interest in order to 
achieve the public interest. 
A different alternative is to tax the generation and disposal of 
wastes. The object would not be to punish the polluters but to get 
them to change their ways. If something becomes more expensive, 
business firms have a natural desire to use less of the item. In this 
case, the production of pollution would become more expensive. 
Every sensible firm would try to reduce the amount of pollution tax 
it pays by curbing its wastes. Adjusting to new taxes on pollution 
would be a matter not of patriotism but of minimizing cost and 
maximizing profit. The pollution tax approach appeals to self-inter-
est in order to achieve the public interest. 
Charging polluters for the pollution they cause gives companies 
an incentive to fmd innovative ways to cut down on their dis-
charges. 86 These fees would raise costs and hence prices for prod-
ucts whose production generates a lot of pollution. It is wrong to 
view this as a way of shifting the burden to the public. The relevant 
factor is that consumer purchasing is not static. Consumer demand 
would shift to products which pollute less -- because they would cost 
less. To stay competitive, high-polluting producers would have to 
economize on pollution, just as they do in the case of other costs of 
production. Since pollution imposes burdens on the environment, it 
is only fair that the costs of cleaning up that pollution should be 
reflected in the price of a product whose production generates this 
burden. 
Nine countries in Western Europe have adopted the "polluter 
pays" principle. In these nations, pollution control is paid for 
directly by the polluting firm or from the money collected from 
effiuent taxes. The West German effiuent-fee system, the oldest in 
operation, began before World War I. It has succeeded in halting 
the decline in water quality throughout the Ruhr Valley, the center 
of West Germany's iron and steel production. It is also serving as a 
model for a more recent French effort. 87 
Practical problems make changes in pollution policy difficult in 
the United States. Both the regulators and the regulated have an 
interest in maintaining the current approach. Pollution taxes have 
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little appeal in the political system, particularly in the Congress. 
Many reject a pollution tax on philosophical grounds, considering 
pollution charges a "license to pollute." They believe that putting a 
price on the act of polluting amounts to an attitude of moral indif-
ference towards polluters. That gets us back to the point made ear-
lier, that many people look at ecological matters as moral issues --
which makes it especially difficult to adopt a more rational and 
workable approach. 
Conclusion 
Although economists are often accused of being patsies for the 
business community, environmental economics makes for strange 
alliances. So far, business interests have opposed the suggestions of 
economists for such sweeping changes in the basic structure of gov-
ernment regulation as using taxes on pollution. Despite the short-
comings of the present system of government regulation, many firms 
have paid the price of complying with existing rules. They have 
learned to adjust to regulatory requirements and to integrate exist-
ing regulatory procedures into their long-term planning. 
As any serious student of business-government relations will 
quickly report, the debate over regulation is miscast when it is 
described as black-hatted business versus white-hatted public inter-
est groups. Almost every regulatory action creates winners and 
losers in the business system and often among other interest groups. 
Clean air legislation, focusing on ensuring that new facilities fully 
meet standards, is invariably supported by existing firms that are 
"grandfathered" approval without having to conform to the same 
high standards as new firms. Regulation thus protects the "ins" from 
the "outs." 
There are many other examples of regulatory bias against change 
and especially against new products, new processes, and new facili-
ties. Tough emissions standards are set for new automobiles, but 
not for older ones. Testing and licensing procedures for new chemi-
cals are more rigorous and thoroughly enforced than for existing 
substances. This ability to profit from the differential impacts of 
regulation helps to explain why business shows little enthusiasm for 
the use of economic incentives and prefers current regulatory tech-
niques. 
But the reform of regulation is truly a consumer issue. The con-
sumer receives the benefits from regulation and bears the burden of 
the costs of compliance in the form of higher prices and less product 
variety. Thus, the consumer has the key stake in improving the cur-
rent regulatory morass. 
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